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Abstract—In Cybernetics (1961 Edition), Professor Norbert 
Wiener noted that “The role of information and the technique of 
measuring and transmitting information constitute a whole 
discipline for the engineer, for the neuroscientist, for the 
psychologist, and for the sociologist”. Sociology aside, the 
neuroscientists and the psychologists inferred “information 
transmitted” using the discrete summations from Shannon 
Information Theory. The present author has since scrutinized the 
psychologists’ approach in depth, and found it wrong. The 
neuroscientists’ approach is highly related, but remains 
unexamined. Neuroscientists quantified “the ability of 
[physiological sensory] receptors (or other signal-processing 
elements) to transmit information about stimulus parameters”. 
Such parameters could vary along a single continuum (e.g., 
intensity), or along multiple dimensions that altogether provide a 
Gestalt – such as a face. Here, unprecedented scrutiny is given to 
how 23 neuroscience papers computed “information transmitted” 
in terms of stimulus parameters and the evoked neuronal spikes. 
The computations relied upon Shannon’s “confusion matrix”, 
which quantifies the fidelity of a “general communication 
system”. Shannon’s matrix is square, with the same labels for 
columns and for rows. Nonetheless, neuroscientists labelled the 
columns by “stimulus category” and the rows by “spike-count 
category”. The resulting “information transmitted” is spurious, 
unless the evoked spike-counts are worked backwards to infer the 
hypothetical evoking stimuli. The latter task is probabilistic and, 
regardless, requires that the confusion matrix be square. Was it? 
For these 23 significant papers, the answer is No. 
Keywords—cybernetics, Wiener, information theory, 
neuroscience, spikes, confusion matrix 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Cybernetics [1, p. vii], Professor Norbert Wiener noted 
that “The role of information and the technique of measuring 
and transmitting information constitute a whole discipline for 
the engineer, for the neuroscientist, for the psychologist, and 
for the sociologist”. Note well the mention of non-engineering 
disciplines. In particular, how psychologists have inferred 
transmitted information using the discrete summations from 
Shannon Information Theory [2] has been critically examined 
by the present author [3]-[6]. However, there has been no 
comparable scrutiny of the neuroscientists’ use of Shannon’s 
summations. The latter use greatly resembles what was done 
by the psychologists, making criticism not just timely but 
well-overdue. The task proves non-trivial, and it exposes 
misinterpretations that have persisted for decades. Further 
problems exist, but are relegated to future papers, because of 
the depth required. Regardless, the present work challenges 
neuroscientists to re-evaluate what can be inferred from 
animal recordings, especially when taken as models of man. 
Sensory neuroscientists have used Shannon Information 
Theory to quantify “the ability of [physiological sensory] 
receptors (or other signal-processing elements) to transmit 
information about stimulus parameters” [7, p. 82]. That usage 
is scrutinized here, starting with Werner and Mountcastle [8], 
who provided the interpretation of Shannon which became the 
blueprint for neuroscience. Table 1 describes Werner and 
Mountcastle and some of the significant papers that followed 
it, which cover a range of dates, species, sensory modalities, 
and types of stimuli. Some papers varied a single characteristic 
of their stimuli, one that fills a continuum, such as the depth of 
thrust of a blunt probe against the skin (experienced as 
differing pressure). As such, the neurons studied can be those 
closest to the outside world, the primary afferents. They are 
typically attached to, or themselves contain, sensory receptors. 
Other neurons that respond to sensory stimuli rely on input 
from the peripheral afferents, but are closer to the brain. The 
cerebral cortex itself can contain neurons that preferentially 
respond to a Gestalt formed from multiple stimulus features. 
Neuroscientists’ use of Information Theory has been 
extremely influential in behavioral science. Unfortunately, as 
will be shown, the information-theory analyses in the papers 
listed in Table 1 are meaningless. Attempts to correct the 
computation, by relating responses back to stimuli 
(“Decoding”; see below), are likewise futile. 
Note well that the information-theory analyses discussed 
here employed the original discrete summations of Shannon 
[2]. Smooth integral forms exist, and some neuroscientists 
have used them. But those are special approaches (e.g., [30]) 
having special problems, deserving later critique. However, 
given the present revelations, neuroscientists’ use of the 
integrals likely will also prove faulty. 
II. THE “GENERAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM”, THE
“CONFUSION MATRIX”, AND THE INFORMATION TRANSMITTED 
In Shannon’s own words [2], his “general communication 
system” consists of (1) “An information source which 
produces a message or sequence of messages to be 
communicated to the receiving terminal”, (2) “A transmitter 
which operates on the message in some way to produce a 
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signal suitable for transmission over the channel”, (3) a 
channel, where “The channel is merely the medium used to 
transmit the signal from transmitter to receiver”, (4) a receiver, 
where “The receiver ordinarily performs the inverse operation 
of that done by the transmitter, reconstructing the message 
from the signal”, and (5) a destination, where “The destination 
is the person (or thing) for whom the message is intended” (the 
italics within the quotes are the originals). 
The sent messages are groups of symbols, such as letters 
arranged into words and then into sentences [2]. Symbols have 
probabilities from which the information transmitted in a 
message can be computed, as follows [2]. Consider n possible 
events; the one that occurs is the outcome, which is uncertain 
if n > 1. If each event has a known probability of occurrence, 
ip , i = 1,..., n, where 11 =∑ =ni ip , then the requisite [amount
of] “uncertainty”, “choice”, or “information”, called SI , is
0,log
1
>−= ∑
=
KppKI i
n
i
iS       (1) 
Shannon set K =1. If events are symbols denoted “k”, then 
signal uncertainty/information SI  is
( ) ( )∑−=
k
S kpkpI log       (2) 
In experiments, ( )kp  is set by the experimenters.
A symbol received is from the set of symbols that can be 
sent, but not all symbols will be received as sent. That is, the 
system is “noisy”. Information transmitted, denoted tI , can be
calculated knowing (a) what symbols “k” (events) were sent, 
(b) what symbols “j” (outcomes) were received, and (c) the 
number of times a symbol sent as “k” was received as “j”, 
denoted Njk. The latter form the “confusion matrix”.  
Fig. 1 shows the confusion matrix for a total number N 
symbols sent. Let ( ) NNkp k.=  = the probability that k was
sent, and ( ) .jkjj NNkp =  = the probability that k was sent if
j was received, from which 
( ) ( )∑∑−=
j k
jjS kpkpE log   (3) 
is the signal equivocation/entropy, and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑∑ +−=−=
j k
jj
k
SSt kpkpkpkpEII loglog   (4)
is the information transmitted. These are averages taken over 
the course of the message. The base of the logarithms is a 
positive integer; when set to 2, the information transmitted is 
in binary information units per symbol, or “bits/symbol”. Note 
that 0≥≥≥ StS EII ; St II =  represents perfect transmission. 
In the coming details, “signal” will be replaced by “stimulus”. 
Note also that if the n symbols or stimuli are equiprobable 
(that is, npi 1=  in Eq. (1), ( ) nkp 1=  in Eq. (2)), then for
base b we have SIbn = , and the number of symbols or stimuli
that the system can potentially correctly indicate is tIb .
--------
N 1 .N 1n-N 1k-N 12N 111
Sum
=NN . n-N . k-N . 2N . 1
Column 
totals
N n .N nn-N nk-N n2N n1n
N j .N jn-N jk-N j2N j1j
--------
N 2 .N 2n-N 2k-N 22N 212
Symbol 
received
(outcome)
Row 
totalsn-k-21
Symbol sent (event)
Fig. 1. Shannon’s Information Theory “confusion matrix”. 
Henceforth, the information transmitted computed 
according to Shannon [2] is denoted truetI , , to distinguish it
from the information transmitted in neuroscientists’ Werner 
and Mountcastle [8] interpretation, here denoted WMtI , .
III. SHANNON INFORMATION THEORY IN NEUROSCIENCE
A. Why use Information Theory in Neuroscience? The 
Variability of Spike Counts in Sensory Neurons 
Applying a sensory stimulus to an organism that has 
neurons, such as a man or a cat, may evoke firing of voltage 
spikes in some of those neurons. Such neurons may respond 
predictably, within some limit of variability, to changes in 
some characterizing feature(s) of the stimulus. In particular, 
the number of neuronal voltage spikes evoked during some 
sub-interval of the interval in which the stimulus is applied – 
the sub-interval called the spike-counting time – will change 
systematically as the stimulus characteristic is changed. This 
spike count is the most commonly used of numerous quantities 
obtainable from neuronal spike trains. For such measures, the 
mean stimulus-evoked spike count tends to smoothly, 
systematically change in response to smooth, systematic 
change(s) in the sensory stimulus. Those measures include the 
latency of the first stimulus-evoked spike (see for example 
[31]; [25], for mean response time; [27]) or interspike intervals 
(e.g., [23]) or “the principal components of the temporal 
waveform of the response” ([12, p. 168]; also [14]-[16], [18]). 
Conclusions reached presently about the viability of 
information theory in neuroscience will apply equally well 
regardless of the particular neuronal response that has been 
used in computing WMtI , , because those conclusions do not
intrinsically depend upon the particulars of the neuronal 
response measure, but rather on how it is employed in 
    
computing WMtI , . Likewise, the present conclusions also 
apply when information-transmitted is computed from more 
than one simultaneous measurable stimulus-evoked neuronal 
response, i.e., a vector of responses, representing an ensemble 
of (usually mutually neighboring) neurons (e.g., [32]). 
Whether the stimulus is varied along a single continuum or 
along many simultaneously (in the case of a Gestalt), each 
application of the same stimulus could, empirically, produce a 
different count of the voltage spikes evoked within the 
counting time. The likelihood that a given count lies within 
any two limits, over repeated applications of the stimulus, can 
be approximated for infinitely close limits by a probability 
density function having a mean and a variance. That is, spike 
count is stochastic, so that the response to the stimulus appears 
to be inherently “confused”. The degree of that confusion is 
what neuroscientists believe that they quantify through their 
use of Information Theory. (The reason for the qualifying 
italics will hopefully soon become clear.) Experiments are 
typically done under conditions such that each spike-count 
distribution is believed to be unchanging (i.e., stationary). To 
sensory neuroscientists, all of this makes a particular stimulus 
a potential Shannon “event”, because it evokes in the neuron, 
on average, a predictable “outcome”. The measured spike-
train feature was taken as Shannon’s “symbol received” and 
the stimulus characteristic being varied (e.g., intensity) was 
taken as Shannon’s “symbol sent”. Of course, if the latter bore 
no relation at all to the former, then the transmitted 
information was zero; SS EI =  in Eq. (4).  
The difference between any “event” and its evoked 
“outcome” could be attributed to “noise”, which 
neuroscientists interpreted as the probabilistic nature of the 
evoked spike count. As Smith et al. [7, p. 94] declared 
concerning spike counts taken from primary afferent neurons, 
“The ability of an organism to make decisions about stimulus 
events is limited by the resolution of its peripheral sensory 
receptors … The concepts and methods of information theory 
[omitted citation] have provided a means for addressing the 
resolving power of these receptors”. Other workers replaced 
“peripheral sensory receptors” with “sensory neurons”, with 
the understanding that peripheral sensory receptors, regardless 
of further processing of their output at “higher” brain-ward 
neurons, did indeed provide the ultimate limit. That is, WMtI ,  
was computed from neuronal responses (whether one neuron 
or several, and regardless of their bodily location) on the tacit 
presumption that WMtI ,  had a putative maximum max,WMtI  
that identified the neuron’s ability to encode the stimulus 
characteristic(s) altered by the experimenter. 
B. The Sensory Neuroscientists’ Confusion Matrix 
1) General description 
In the neuroscientists’ confusion matrix, in contrast to 
Shannon’s, the “symbols sent” (“events”) are stimuli, divided 
into ranges called stimulus categories. The “symbols received” 
(“outcomes”) are numbers of voltage spikes evoked in the 
neuron over some counting time. As noted above, repetitions 
of a given stimulus can produce different numbers of spikes 
within some agreed-upon counting time; there is presently no 
means of determining the “correct” counting time, should one 
exist. Perhaps for this reason, neuroscientists treated ranges of 
spike counts as the labels for the rows of the confusion matrix, 
spike-count categories. Fig. 2 shows such a confusion matrix, 
but in which (unlike the literature) the number of stimulus 
categories equals the number of spike-count categories, i.e., a 
square matrix as in Fig. 1. Experiment-wise, each stimulus 
category was typically represented by a single stimulus, which 
differed from those in other categories (for a rare exception 
see [17], in which 37 stimuli were sometimes grouped into 3 
categories). Thus, each matrix entry in Fig. 2 is typically the 
number of times that a particular stimulus evoked a spike 
count that fell within the particular spike-count category, i.e. 
( )kp  is “the probability of giving stimulus k” whereas ( )kp j  
is “the probability that stimulus k was given, given a spike 
count in spike-count category j”. 
As noted, square matrices are not typical of the literature. 
Fig. 2 represents what a confusion matrix might look like if 
firing characteristics were to be used to “work backwards” to 
infer what the evoking stimuli had been. That exercise has 
sometimes been attempted (see below). The actual 
construction of the majority of neuroscientists’ confusion 
matrices will now be described. 
2) The neuroscientists’ confusion matrix for stimuli 
characterized by values along a smooth continuum 
Werner and Mountcastle [8] provided the archtype sensory 
neuroscience confusion matrix. All subsequent papers, 
whether using sums or integrals to compute information 
transmitted, follow their model. Werner and Mountcastle 
recorded spikes evoked in primary afferent neurons by a 
narrow probe quickly applied and held for 1 second or less 
against the center of touch-sensitive Iggo corpuscles in the 
shaven hairy skin of the hind limb of cats and monkeys (the 
specific monkey species was not mentioned, which became a 
common error). The stimulus intensities were the depths-of-
depression of the probe, each possible value equidistant in 
micrometers (microns) from its nearest neighbors, each its 
own stimulus-intensity category. Probe-evoked spikes were 
counted for “a time which begins within 100-150 msec. 
[milliseconds] of stimulus onset and lasts for about 4-500 
msec.” [8, p. 379]. Spike-count categories were made by 
dividing the stimulus-evoked spike counts into groups 
differing by 2 spikes. 
Table 1 lists the widths (W, in numbers of spikes) of the 
spike-count categories, as well as C, the numbers of columns,  
and R, the numbers of rows, in the confusion matrices, for 
Werner and Mountcastle [8] and subsequent others. If C=R, a 
matrix is square. The duration of application of the stimulus 
could be varied, as could the spike-counting duration. The 
spike-count categories would inevitably not all have equal 
widths; empirically, mean spike-firing rates are nonlinear 
functions of relevant stimulus characteristics. Hence, 
experimenters usually chose stimuli at equal intervals, along a 
range of the relevant stimulus characteristic within which the 
evoked firing rate is a straight line when plotted versus either 
linear or logarithmic scales of said characteristic. The 
experimenters likewise chose equal widths for their spike-
count categories, except perhaps the uppermost and lowermost 
    
categories, which might be extended to their respective 
infinities. 
3) The neuroscientists’ confusion matrix for stimuli 
characterized by their Gestalt 
Here, as in the examples above which varied the stimulus 
intensity, each stimulus is its own stimulus category. 
Tovee et al. [15] provide an example of brain recordings in 
response to Gestalt stimuli. The stimuli were “4 face stimuli” 
[15, p. 642] which “were monkey or human, usually in frontal 
view, but in some cases in profile view” [15, p. 642]. The 
faces were presented to attentive macaque monkeys who were 
trained to fixate at 5 different points of any image, actual 
visible points that were presented either at the center of the 
image, or at the edge of the image and towards any of the four 
corners of the video monitor used for viewing. The subjects 
thus maintained a constant behavior, giving altogether 4x5=20 
“stimulus categories”. Fixation points were “blinked off 200 
ms [milliseconds] before the test stimulus appeared” [15, p. 
641]. The latter lasted 500 ms. 
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE USE OF SHANNON INFORMATION 
THEORY IN SENSORY NEUROSCIENCE 
Neuroscientists’ use of Shannon Information Theory has a 
fatal problem concerning the interpretation of the Shannon 
concepts of “event” and “outcome”, as follows. 
A. Shannon’s Requirements (i.e., The Theory) 
1) Each “event” is from a limited set of distinct things, 
and evokes an “outcome”, one of the possible “events” 
For “events” (symbols transmitted) and “outcomes” 
(symbols received), Shannon [2] used, as examples, English 
letters. They form a limited set whose members are mutually 
distinguishable, insofar as a sent “A” received as an “A” will 
not normally be confused with a “B”. To Shannon, each 
“event” had just one “outcome”, that is one of the “events”. 
2) The Shannon confusion matrix is square 
The symbol received need not be the one transmitted. 
Regardless, Shannon’s confusion matrix has rows labelled by 
the same symbols as its columns; the matrix is square (Fig. 1). 
B. Sensory Neuroscience (i.e., The Practice) 
1) Each “event” is from a limited set of distinct things, 
and evokes an “outcome” –  not one of the possible “events”, 
but altogether different in character 
a) Each “event” is from a limited set of distinct things 
The sensory neuroscientists’ “events” are stimuli – or 
perhaps stimulus categories. This uncertainty arises because a 
stimulus characterization (such as intensity) forms what, to our 
measuring instruments, seems to be a continuum (i.e., 
macroscopically smooth, even if bumpy at the quantum scale). 
And even when the stimulus is a Gestalt such as a face, small 
changes in the face (along one or more dimensions) might be 
indiscriminable to the judge (the human eye, and the mind 
connected to it) – such that faces represent a multi-
dimensional continuum. In fact, in all of the 23 papers 
scrutinized here, each stimulus category k contained a stimulus 
of just one characterization from the relevant set of 
characterizations (face, shape, intensity, or whatever).  
Compelling reasons for that, which are not mentioned in 
the literature, are as follows. Consider that if different stimuli 
within a given stimulus category differ sufficiently that the 
resulting evoked spikes consistently fall into different spike-
count categories, then each of the differing stimuli is acting as 
if it could be placed within a separate stimulus category. 
Conversely, if m different stimuli within the given stimulus 
category are sufficiently close in character that the resulting 
spike counts fall within just one spike-count category, then 
those m different stimuli are emulating a single stimulus 
repeated m times. These problems confuse the interpretation of 
WMtI , . The confusion is avoided only when each stimulus 
category is restricted to a single stimulus which differs from 
all the others employed, such that the difference between 
“stimulus” and “stimulus category” disappears. 
Stimulus category
--------
N 1 .N 1n-N 1k-N 12N 111
Sum
= NN . n-N . k-N . 2N . 1
Column 
totals
N n .N nn-N nk-N n2N n1n
N j .N jn-N jk-N j2N j1j
--------
N 2 .N 2n-N 2k-N 22N 212
Spike-count
category
Row
totalsn-k-21
 
Fig. 2. The “confusion matrix” of sensory neuroscience. 
 
b) Each “event” evokes an “outcome” –  not one of the 
possible “events”, but altogether different in character 
The neuroscientists’ “outcome” is a spike count. Or is it a 
spike-count category? Neuroscientists don’t clarify this. 
Regardless, neither a spike-count category nor a spike count is 
a stimulus. Hence, regardless of whether the “outcomes” are 
taken as spike counts or as spike-count categories, “outcomes” 
do not have the same character as “events”. 
But can “outcomes” be made to have the same character as 
“events”? To compute a meaningful truetI , would require 
working backwards from each stimulus-evoked spike count to 
the stimulus that the spike-count implied, which would not 
necessarily be the stimulus actually given. To attempt working 
backwards, how would the number of stimulus categories have 
to compare to the number of spike-count categories? The 
answer is that each spike-count category j (representing a row 
in the sensory neuroscientists’ confusion matrix) must have a 
single corresponding, “correct” stimulus category k 
(representing a column of the matrix). And even so, 
specification of the implied stimulus category would be 
    
uncertain, because (1) the relation between stimulus and mean 
spike count, is usually nonlinear (there are too many 
supporting references for this) and (2) the spike count evoked 
by a given stimulus is stochastic, as noted above. This issue is 
pursued further in Section V, below. 
2) The neuroscience confusion matrix is not square 
Did the papers discussed above meet the requirement of 
equal numbers of spike-count categories and stimulus 
categories, that is, a square confusion matrix? Table 1 lists the 
numbers of rows and columns in the respective published 
matrices, and shows that none were square. Indeed, their 
creators revealed no inkling that squareness was required. 
V. APPARENT EXCEPTIONS: “DECODING” 
Shannon’s system [2] contains an encoder (the transmitter) 
and a decoder (the receiver). The latter was assumed to 
convert the “noisy signal” back into a message containing a 
subset of the symbols that are available to form the message 
that was originally given to the transmitter. Thus the 
engineer’s confusion matrix has rows and columns having the 
same labels. Did sensory neuroscientists ever attempt to 
“decode” the stimulus-evoked neuronal firing, in the sense that 
a decoder “receives a spike train as input and guesses which 
stimulus evoked the spike train” [25, p. 200]? Yes – for 
example, Georgopoulos and Massey [33] and Furukawa and 
Middlebrooks [31] had rows labelled the same as columns, 
that is, by the stimulus characteristic employed. They 
accomplished the seemingly impossible task that is sometimes 
called “reconstruction”, “simulation”, or “decoding” (e.g., 
[25], [35]) by inferring the entries in their square confusion 
matrices, based upon their recorded responses of neurons, and 
using statistical models based upon varieties of assumptions. 
The methods are too elaborate to be described here. 
Importantly, neither paper ([31], [33]) showed any explicit 
understanding of why their matrix was square. Georgopoulos 
and Massey [33], for example, merely cited Sakitt [34], who 
had used square matrices in psychophysics.  
Let us denote the inferred values of truetI ,  as 
(inferred), truetI . Consider what would happen if 
circumstances existed which favored back-calculation. For 
example, the neurons examined in [8]-[11] showed remarkably 
reproducible spike firing, in that the variance of the firing rate 
to a given stimulus was remarkably low. And there was 
evidently a method to lower the variance-to-mean ratio in the 
counted spikes, namely, to employ a longer recording epoch 
(for explicit evidence see, for example, Rogers et al. [21, p. 
457]), as WMtI ,  tended to rise as recording epoch was 
lengthened ([8, Fig. 22]; [10, Fig. 6]; [7, Fig. 8]; [15, Fig. 13]; 
[20, Fig. 9]; [24, Fig. 3]; [27, Fig. 3]; but for an exceptional 
momentary dip see [21, Fig. 6, top panel, several traces] and 
[22, Fig. 3]). As such, WMtI ,  could be made as arbitrarily 
close to SI  as neuronal biochemistry allowed, or as close to 
2.81 as desired (such that the number of discernable categories 
was 72 81.2 ≈ , the result from psychophysical “absolute 
identification” experiments; see [3]), by simply (1) altering the 
number of different stimuli (i.e., the size of the stimulus set) 
and their spacing along the stimulus characteristic that was 
manipulated, while simultaneously (2) gerrymandering the 
number and widths of the spike-count categories. And close 
reading of [7] and [8]-[11] suggests that this is, in fact, what 
had been attempted. Fig. 3 illustrates such a case, given 
simplifying assumptions (for illustration’s sake) of equal 
numbers of spike-count and stimulus categories, and 
distributions of equal variance. Here, the distribution of spike-
counts evoked by each different stimulus lies effectively 
within the corresponding spike-count category. In such cases, 
there would be little purpose to computing (inferred), truetI , as 
it, like WMtI , , would closely approach SI .  
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Fig. 3. Relation of stimulus categories to distributions of spike counts when 
information transmitted, tI , approximates the stimulus information, SI . A 
stimulus representing each stimulus category evokes neuronal voltage spikes 
which are counted over some counting time. Evoked spike count, over 
repeated presentations of the stimulus, is imagined as being distributed 
according to a Gaussian probability density function, assumed identical for the 
different given stimulus intensities. Tracing backward from spike-count 
category to stimulus category leaves little ambiguity about which recorded 
spike-count corresponded to which stimulus category. 
Now consider the opposite assumption about the 
distribution of spike-counts for any spike-count category, 
namely, that it is very broad – so broad, in fact, that 
SIWMtI <<, . Fig. 4 illustrates broad distributions. This is the 
sort of situation found, for example, in Tolhurst [13], in which 
spike-count “variance is usually 2-5 times the average 
response” [13, p. 410], resulting in a mean WMtI ,  of 0.71 bits 
(i.e., less than 2 correctly identified choices) across 23 
neurons, given 14 different stimuli ( 81.3=SI  bits). Then, 
backwards-calculation of stimulus category from spike count 
would be a matter of probability (as used in Signal Detection 
Theory, for example; see [36], [37]) rather than certainty, so 
that SItruetI <<(inferred), ; indeed, (inferred), truetI  could 
well approach zero. WMtI ,  was indeed, in many of the papers 
listed in Table 1, remarkably small (data omitted). 
There is great irony here, in that the very reason that 
Shannon’s Information Theory was applied to neurons in the 
    
first place – their stochastic firing – may be the reason why 
such a computation cannot work. tI  could be yet closer to 
zero if the numbers of spike-count categories and stimulus 
categories were unequal; in such a case, the back-assignment 
of spike-count to the hypothetical evoking stimulus would 
involve even more miss-assignment, which, on average, would 
reduce (rather than inflate) (inferred), truetI . 
Probabil i ty  
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Fig. 4. Relation of stimulus categories to distributions of spike counts when 
information transmitted, tI , is likely to be substantially less than the stimulus 
information, SI . After Fig. 3, each spike-count distribution is Gaussian, and 
is identical for the different given stimulus intensities, but the variances are 
substantially broader than in Fig. 3 – so broad that tracing backward from a 
given spike-count to the stimulus that evoked it is effectively impossible. The 
stimulus-attribute and spike-count continua are pictured as being open at their 
top and bottom; otherwise, the spike-count distributions would become 
increasingly skewed as the end spike-count categories are approached (as seen 
in psychology “absolute identifications” [4]).  
 
For there to be any possibility of inferring truetI ,  from 
neuronal responses, the neuronal code must be understood for 
the stimulus property that the experimenter is manipulating, in 
order that neuronal firing can be appropriately apportioned 
into response categories that are appropriate for the given 
stimulus categories. And yet, without such knowledge, 
WMtI ,  is currently used to choose between different possible 
neuronal codes (e.g., spike count versus first-spike latency 
versus principal components; see for example [12], [14]-[16], 
[18], [25], [27], [28], [31]). 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Werner and Mountcastle [8] first described an 
interpretation of Shannon’s Information Theory [2], one later 
adopted by many neuroscientists, to estimate tI , the 
information transmitted by sensory neurons. The computation 
depends upon the numerical entries in Shannon’s “confusion 
matrix”, which quantifies the fidelity of Shannon’s “general 
communication system”. The Shannon matrix has columns 
labelled by symbol sent (“event”) and rows labelled by symbol 
received (“outcome”). Shannon assumed that for each “event” 
there is only one “outcome”, one of the possible “events”. 
Therefore Shannon’s matrix is necessarily square. But in the 
sensory neuroscientists’ matrix, columns were labelled by 
“stimulus category” and rows were labelled by “spike-count 
category”, neuronal voltage spikes being the response to 
stimuli. This does not yield a true tI , because spike-
generation is stochastic, with a mean stimulus-dependence that 
is nonlinear. truetI ,  could hypothetically still be computed if 
spike counts could somehow be related backwards to their 
implied stimulus, given a square confusion matrix. Squareness 
was therefore checked for, in 23 significant sensory 
neuroscience studies. Squareness was not found, and indeed, 
neither Werner and Mountcastle [8] nor any of their successors 
explained why they had ignored Shannon’s requirement of 
identical labelling for rows and columns. The tI ’s computed 
in those studies over five decades, here denoted WMtI , , are 
gratuitous, yet they have been given great cachet and continue 
to be computed. 
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Table 1. Details of papers that express information transmitted based on stimulus-evoked spike counts, and details of the respective confusion matrices. The papers 
need not represent the relative contributions, in quantity or quality, of the respective authors or laboratories. Some details were unclear, but efforts to contact 
authors of papers that were more than a few years old sometimes proved futile. “W” is width of spike-count category in units of “spikes”. “C” is number of 
confusion-matrix columns (stimulus categories). “R” is number of confusion-matrix rows (spike-count categories). V means “Varied”. That is, when the 
number of spike-count categories is fixed, the number of spikes differentiating each spike-count category from its neighbors is determined by the range of firing 
rates of the neuron; likewise, the latter determines the number of spike-count categories when the number of spikes differentiating each spike-count category is 
fixed. An extreme case was Gnadt and Breznen [17, p. 3528], who established a different number of response categories for each neuron, by dividing the range of 
firing rate of that neuron by the “number of distinguishable levels” for that neuron (their Table 2), established from modelling of its firing-rate behaviour.   
Ref. Stimuli Species Type and location of recording W C R 
8 Square-wave thrusts of blunt probe, of amplitudes differing by equal increments, to pressure receptors in skin 
Cat, 
Monkey 
Single-neuron recordings from slowly- 
adapting mechanoreceptors on hind limb 2 4-30 23 
9 Square-wave thrusts of blunt probe, of amplitudes differing by equal increments, to pressure receptors in skin Cat 
Single-neuron recordings from slowly- 
adapting mechanoreceptors on the face, 
and from the slowly-adapting “relay 
neurons” to which they project, in parallel, 
in nucleus oralis and in nucleus caudalis 
V 
2, 4, 
5, 8, 
16 
22 
10 Square-wave thrusts of blunt probe, of amplitudes differingby equal increments, to pressure receptors in skin 
Cat,
Caiman 
Single-neuron recordings from slowly- 
adapting mechanoreceptors on hind limb 1, 2 4-149 21 
11 Square-wave thrusts, of amplitudes differing by equal increments, to the tooth Cat Single neurons to the canine tooth 1 32, 128 
≤ 100
(mean=60)
7 Sucrose-in-NaCl solutions of different sucrose concentrations, flowing through the recording electrode Blowfly 
Single sugar receptors of 
the tarsal hairs of prothoracic legs 5 11 18-19 
12 Visual fixation of 2-dimensional black-&-white checkerboard Walsh patterns Macaque Single neurons in inferior temporal cortex V 128 12 
    
13 
Varied contrasts, of one cycle of a high-contrast sinusoidal 
grating of optimal orientation and spatial frequency, moving 
past an arbitrary point in the neuron’s receptive field 
Cat Single-neuron recordings from 10 simple cells, 14 complex cells, all in area 17 2 14 23 
14 Visual fixation of 2-dimensional black-&-white checkerboard Walsh patterns Macaque 
Single retinal ganglion cell fibers, single 
neurons in lateral geniculate nucleus,  
single complex cells in layers 2 and 3  
of primary visual cortex, and single  
neurons in inferior temporal cortex 
V 128 12 
15 
Visual fixation on the center or “corners’ of each of 
4 faces in total (monkey or human), usually 
in frontal view, but in some cases in profile view 
Macaque Single neurons responding selectively  to faces, in the superior temporal sulcus V 20 15 
16 
Visual fixation on the center of each of 20 faces in total 
(monkey or human), usually in frontal view, 
but in two cases in profile view 
Macaque Single neurons responding selectively to faces, in the superior temporal sulcus V 20 15 
17 Visual fixation of small spots, crosses, or X’s that moved momentarily from one point to another Macaque 
Single neurons in lateral bank of 
the intraparietal sulcus (area LIP) V 3, 37 V 
18 Up to 9 different odorants, pure chemicals representing different odor classes, sniffed in an odor-discrimination task Macaque Single neurons in orbitofrontal cortex V 8-9 15 
19 
Visual fixation on the center of each of 4 monkey faces
and 3 human faces, each having one of  4 different facial 
expressions; and 2 shapes, each in 5 different colors 
Macaque 
Single neurons responding selectively to  
faces, in the inferior temporal cortex, include- 
ing both banks of the superior temporal sulcus 
V 3, 4 15 
20 Kitten’s meow, natural and laboratory-altered in its temporal and spectral properties Cat 
Single-unit spike trains, sorted from multi- 
unit recordings, in primary auditory cortex 2 9 V 
21 Manipulation of rate and volume of mechanical inflation of the lungs with a mechanical ventilator 
N. Z.
white 
rabbit
Single neurons of 
the cervical vagus nerve 1 
2 
to ≥20 2 to ≥22 
22 Forced sinusoidal whisking of whisker according to different vibration frequencies and amplitudes Wistar rat Neuronal clusters at barrel cortex 1 49 V 
23 Free-field click trains having regular or irregular (Poisson-distributed) inter-click intervals Marmoset Single neurons in primary auditory cortex 1 19 100 
24 Random dot textures moving through a square aperture in a field of stationary random dots Macaque 
Single neurons in
extrastriate visual area MT V 13, 17 V 
25 
Ferret: Broadband noise bursts from different virtual
source directions, presented over headphones 
 
Cat: Bird songs, natural and laboratory-altered in their 
temporal and spectral properties, delivered through a  
sealed acoustic system to the tympanic membrane 
Ferret 
 
 
Cat 
Single neurons in primary auditory cortex 1 
24 
 
 
15 
V (3-9 at 
least; their 
Fig. 2) 
26 
Bird songs, natural and laboratory-altered in their temporal
and spectral properties, delivered through a sealed 
acoustic system to the tympanic membrane 
Cat 
Single neurons in inferior colliculus 
or in medial geniculate body 
or in primary auditory cortex 
1 15 V (10 in their Fig 3)
27 
Half-sinusoidal force change applied to fingertip,
at 5 different possible force directions, with 
3 possible surface curvatures, of the applied surface 
Man 
Single tactile afferents
that terminated in the distal segment 
of the index, long, or ring finger 
1 3-5 13-14 
28 
Up to 6 different tastants, pure chemicals representing
different taste classes, delivered as a fixed 
volume of liquid to the monkey’s mouth via syringe 
Macaque Single neurons in orbitofrontal cortex V 6 15 
29 Square-wave forced whisking of whisker over sandpapers at 3 distances (3 “skip-resistance levels”) Wistar rat
Compound action potential of transected 
deep vibrissal nerve innervating a 
vibrissal follicle (DELTA vibrissal nerve) 
See 
note* 5 35* 
 
* Response categories were 1 millivolt wide (see Farfan et al., Fig. 3). They computed WMtI ,  for only 3 of the 5 stimuli (see their Figs. 6 and 7). 
 
